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ROBERTS, KENNEDY, AND THE SUBTLE
DIFFERENCES THAT MATTER IN OBERGEFELL
Joseph Landau*
I.
By upholding a nationwide right to marry for same-sex couples in
Obergefell v. Hodges,1 the Supreme Court’s enormously significant
decision resolves a major civil rights question that has percolated through
our legal system and coursed through our culture for some time. The ruling
was not an unforeseen outcome, but it brings welcome clarity by ensuring
marriage rights for same-sex couples throughout all fifty states. Building
on United States v. Windsor2—a 2013 decision striking down section 3 of
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which prevented gay and lesbian
married couples from receiving federal benefits—Obergefell is an important
and fitting capstone to prior cases about the constitutional rights of samesex couples.3
Obergefell and Windsor feature an especially vibrant debate between
Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts, two Justices whose overlapping
judicial philosophies lead them to agree on most legal outcomes.4 Both
Justices value respectfulness of political process, yet both are, as a matter of
principle, prepared to intercede when there are especially strong reasons for
doing so. Both Justices are largely committed to the views of the more
traditionally conservative wing of the Court, yet both have been willing to
move to the middle to preserve certain democracy-reinforcing values, as
witnessed by their mutual votes in the 2014–2015 Term to uphold portions
of the Affordable Care Act in King v. Burwell.5
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Nestor
Davidson, Joseph Fitzgerald, Jeffrey Harper, Clare Huntington, Ethan Leib, David
Menschel, Jacob Sayward, Brian O’Toole, and Ben Zipursky for their comments and
suggestions.
1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
3. Id. at 2696. Section 3 of DOMA defined marriage as “a legal union between one
man and one woman,” reserving “the word ‘spouse’” under federal statutory and regulatory
law “only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.” See Defense of
Marriage Act § 3(a), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
4. During the four consecutive Terms ending in 2014, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Kennedy were in agreement 88 percent of the time. See Jeremy Bowers, Adam Liptak &
Derek Willis, Which Supreme Court Justices Vote Together Most and Least Often, N.Y.
TIMES (July 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/24/upshot/24up-scotusagreement-rates.html [http://perma.cc/UJB6-WL2F].
5. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
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Nevertheless, the two Justices are at loggerheads in the gay rights cases.
Kennedy’s majority opinions and Roberts’s dissents in Obergefell and
Windsor reveal a nuanced difference of opinion regarding the institutional
role of the judiciary that leads them to dramatically different outcomes.6
The gay rights cases show Justice Kennedy to be a functionalist whose view
of constitutional adjudication varies based on the particular circumstances
of a given controversy. Chief Justice Roberts, by contrast, is a formalist
whose bright-line approach to the separation of powers admits no exception
and leads ineluctably to the conclusion that emerging civil rights issues
must always be left to the political process.
Yet Kennedy’s functionalism in Obergefell and Windsor also has
formalist undertones of its own, rooted largely in procedural matters, and
therein lies at least one major difference between Roberts and Kennedy.
Kennedy appears genuinely concerned about legal regularity, notice, and
the manageability of rights—and this instinct drives him to intervene in
cases that Chief Justice Roberts would leave entirely to the political
process. Justice Kennedy’s unusual blend of formalism and functionalism,
hardly unique to his gay rights opinions, fuels a dispute with the Chief
Justice that has emerged in the contexts of national security and criminal
sentencing and will likely resurface in future controversies as well.7
II.
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion in Obergefell credits the
plaintiffs’ “strong arguments rooted in social policy and considerations of

6. Roberts and Kennedy also sparred over the question of standing in Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), with Roberts writing the majority opinion and Kennedy the
dissent. Hollingsworth considered the issue of whether private intervenors who defended
California’s Proposition 8—a voter initiative that restricted marriage to different-sex
couples—had Article III standing to appeal the trial court decision striking down Proposition
8 in federal district court. Id. Hollingsworth raised different questions than those in
Obergefell and Windsor and will not be addressed at any length.
7. In Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), Roberts and Kennedy took to opposite
sides on the availability of habeas corpus protections for foreign national detainees at
Guantanamo Bay. Both Justices adopted a separation of powers analysis—with Kennedy
vindicating the petitioners’ access to habeas based on deeper concerns about procedural
regularity at Guantanamo, see id. at 779–92, and Roberts adopting a purely formalist
analysis based on legislative supremacy and judicial restraint, see id. at 801–26 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting). In Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), Roberts and Kennedy again
engaged a substantive disagreement highlighting their disparate takes on procedural
regularity. Much of Kennedy’s majority opinion that the Eighth Amendment bars life
sentences without parole for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses appeared rooted in
a concern about the disparate application of current sentencing regimes across the various
states. See id. at 74–75 (finding a bright-line rule “necessary to prevent the possibility that
life without parole sentences will be imposed on juvenile nonhomicide offenders who are not
sufficiently culpable to merit that punishment”). While Chief Justice Roberts agreed that the
particular sentence was unwarranted in the case at bar, he sharply rejected Kennedy’s
blanket Eighth Amendment rule as a curative to sentencing inequities. For Roberts, “judges
will never have perfect foresight—or perfect wisdom—in making sentencing decisions” and
the ultimate decisions should therefore be left to “sentencing judges applying their reasoned
judgment to each case that comes before them.” Id. at 96 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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fairness” and acknowledges that their “position has undeniable appeal.”8
But where unenumerated rights are concerned, he believes the Supreme
Court should never venture into ongoing disputes of political significance:
“[T]his Court is not a legislature. Whether same-sex marriage is a good
idea should be of no concern to us. Under the Constitution, judges have
power to say what the law is, not what it should be.”9 Thus, the same-sex
marriage debate must continue to unfold in the precincts of politics, the
media, and culture—not the courts.
Even as Justice Kennedy reaches a contrary outcome, he pays lip service
to a view—not altogether different from the Chief Justice’s—that “it is
most often through democracy that liberty is preserved and protected in our
lives.”10 Yet Kennedy casts the democratic process in far more open-ended
terms. His is a dialogic jurisprudence informed through consultation with a
broad group of governmental and non-governmental actors in the framing
of a conversation about rights. The marriage debate, he explains, has been
shaped by “referenda, legislative debates, and grassroots campaigns, as well
as countless studies, papers, books, and other popular and scholarly
writings.”11 And “[t]here has been extensive litigation in state and federal
courts” as well.12 Respecting dialogue means being open to considering all
of these various sources, including ones that might not traditionally carry
legal or constitutional weight. Kennedy thus rejects the argument “that it
would be appropriate . . . to await further public discussion and political
measures before licensing same-sex marriages”;13 for Kennedy, a sufficient
amount of discussion and political change has already occurred.
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy does not rely exclusively on legislative
success in the form of enacting statutes or passing referenda; he is also
interested in the less concrete manifestations that have shaped the marriage
landscape—“debates,” “grassroots campaigns,” and “studies, papers, books,
and other popular and scholarly writings.”14 The conversation—regardless
of actual legislative outcome—drives the constitutional change, and when a
certain saturation point is reached, “individuals need not await legislative
action before asserting a fundamental right.”15 In those circumstances, the
Court must step in “even if the broader public disagrees and even if the
legislature refuses to act.”16
After laying out this broad and open-ended conception of the marriage
debate, Justice Kennedy recognizes the inequitable state of affairs it has
produced. An array of legislation, voter initiatives, and court decisions has
caused an “impermissible geographic variation in the meaning of federal

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Obergegell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2605 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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law.”17 Same-sex couples in some states enjoy state law protections of
“taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate succession;
spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access”;18 and the like,
while similarly situated couples in other states lack those same protections.
This is not a small problem, and the inequity raises large concerns about
evenhandedness and the equitable administration of law, something the
Supreme Court is uniquely equipped to respond to—and resolve. When the
laws become this unmanageable, unworkable, and inequitable, “[t]he
Nation’s courts are open.”19
III.
Windsor also featured a dispute between Kennedy and Roberts that arose
out of the Obama Administration’s refusal to defend in court the
constitutionality of section 3 of DOMA.20 The Obama Administration’s
litigation position raised an apparent justiciability problem because the
plaintiff in that case, Edie Windsor, had prevailed at the district court level
(and again before the court of appeals), and the Obama Administration
appealed its losses in court in an effort to sustain—not overturn—the rule of
law articulated below.21
The justiciability question—whether the Court could reach the merits of
a suit in which the appellant, while technically losing the case, had agreed
with the legal analysis by the inferior court—provoked another tense and
sharp debate between Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy. Roberts
believed the Court should leave the matter solely to the political process
and not hear the merits. During oral argument, he criticized the President
for lacking “the courage of his convictions” by refusing to defend (while
continuing to enforce) a law his administration determined was
unconstitutional.22 Roberts chastised the President for placing the issue in
the Court’s hands, seemingly saying (in the Chief Justice’s words), “[o]h,
we’ll wait till the Supreme Court tells us we have no choice.”23
While Justice Kennedy’s majority decision delivered a very different
outcome—namely, that the Obama Administration’s enforce-but-notdefend policy did not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to rule on the
statute’s constitutionality and that the law was in fact unconstitutional24—
he appeared to agree with Roberts’s starting point that, as a general matter,
the President should not “challenge statutes in the judicial forum rather than
17. Id. at 2606.
18. Id. at 2601.
19. Id. at 2605.
20. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S.
House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorneygeneral-congress-litigation-involving-defense-marriage-act [http://perma.cc/KW9E-D988].
21. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683–84 (2013). Once the Obama
Administration refused to defend DOMA, others stepped in to argue in favor of the statute’s
constitutionality. Id. at 2684.
22. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307).
23. Id.
24. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686.
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making the case to Congress for their amendment or repeal.”25 But
Kennedy did not see Windsor as an ordinary case. The Obama
Administration had come to a “principled determination” that statesponsored sexual-orientation discrimination was unconstitutional, and that
position led it to conclude that DOMA could no longer be sustained.26 This
view was the product of a long period of deliberation and was consistent
with many of the Obama Administration’s contemporaneous interpretive
decisions about LGBT rights.27 Its position also resonated with a growing
chorus of state executive branch actors and legislatures, as well as a number
of state and federal courts.28 While “the integrity of the political process
would be at risk if difficult constitutional issues were simply referred to the
Court as a routine exercise,”29 the executive’s position was consistent with
a growing consensus across multiple governments and institutions. And
that consensus, once again, brought Kennedy to a flexible jurisprudence
that sharply contrasted with that of the Chief Justice.
Just as the “impermissible geographic variation in [marriage] law”30
motivated Kennedy’s constitutional analysis in Obergefell, concerns about
procedural regularity influenced his Windsor opinion. Without a definitive
ruling from the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of section 3 of
DOMA,
[t]he district courts in 94 districts throughout the Nation would be without
precedential guidance . . . involving the whole of DOMA’s sweep
involving over 1,000 federal statutes and a myriad of federal
regulations . . . . Rights and privileges of hundreds of thousands of
persons would be adversely affected . . . . [I]t is certain that the cost in
judicial resources and expense of litigation for all persons adversely
affected would be immense. . . . [T]he costs, uncertainties, and alleged
harm and injuries likely would continue for a time measured in years
before the issue is resolved.31

These conflicting legal regimes produced “unusual and urgent
circumstances”32 necessitating the Court’s exceptional exercise of
jurisdiction over the case and attendant resolution of the substantive
question of DOMA’s unconstitutionality.

25. Id. at 2689.
26. Id.
27. See Joseph Landau, Presidential Constitutionalism and Civil Rights, 55 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1719, 1756–65 (2014) [hereinafter Landau, Presidential Constitutionalism];
see also Joseph Landau, DOMA and Presidential Discretion: Interpreting and Enforcing
Federal Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 619, 624–47 (2012).
28. Landau, Presidential Constitutionalism, supra note 27, at 1764–65, 1764 nn. 250–
52.
29. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689.
30. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606 (2015).
31. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688.
32. Id.
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IV.
Chief Justice Roberts’s formal approach to institutional process in
Obergefell and Windsor has the benefit of clarity—it purports to say exactly
when, and only when, courts can intervene to resolve substantive disputes.
By contrast, Kennedy’s is a largely functionalist methodology that changes
case by case and from one context to the next. While the metes and bounds
of Kennedy’s functionalism are not always clear, Windsor and Obergefell
provide some indication of what seems to matter most to Kennedy. The
“impermissible geographic variation”33 in Obergefell and the “costs,
uncertainties, and alleged harm and injuries”34 in Windsor point to
Kennedy’s deeper commitment to uniformity, notice, and equitable
administration of the law. Thus, Kennedy’s jurisprudence is couched not
only within the separation of powers, but concerns about procedural
regularity and consistency. Put differently, there is more than a hint of
formalism underlying Kennedy’s functionalism—a subtlety within his
jurisprudence that marks an important dividing line with the Chief Justice.
Dialogue and consensus are also important values for Kennedy. While
his criteria for Court action are not entirely self-evident, they take note of
(without requiring) legislative success and are driven by a consensus-based
approach across various institutions (and not just governmental ones) about
the right answer to a given legal question. Majoritarian policy debates seem
to drive Kennedy—at least in part—as well as the sense that rights need
protection when unevenly handled or administered.35 This is a far cry from
the classic individual rights conception associated with United States v.
Carolene Products,36 which addressed the need to protect “discrete and
insular minorities” from untoward prejudice.37 Kennedy’s is a different
brand of jurisprudence; as the gay rights cases indicate, he is comfortable
leaving many important rights questions unresolved. Neither of his
majority opinions in Windsor nor Obergefell addresses (let alone resolves)
the question whether governmental distinctions based on sexual orientation
trigger heightened judicial scrutiny or are subject to existing sex
discrimination protections; thus, the opinion’s doctrinal ramifications are
less apparent.38
But even as Justice Kennedy claims to embrace the Chief Justice’s belief
in limited judicial interference within ongoing policy debates, he makes
33. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2606.
34. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688.
35. For an intriguing look at the role majoritarian consensus plays within Justice
Kennedy’s death penalty jurisprudence, see David Menschel, Justice Kennedy Quietly
Empowers Death Penalty Opponents, AM. CONST. SOC’Y BLOG (July 2, 2014),
https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/justice-kennedy-quietly-empowers-death-penalty-opponents
[http://perma.cc/DKX9-7A8J].
36. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
37. Id. at 153 n.4.
38. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Obergefell’s Conservatism: Reifying Familial Fronts,
84 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 23 (2015) (“In lieu of a straightforward, and far more defensible,
decision based purely on the Equal Protection Clause, Justice Kennedy’s reliance on the Due
Process Clause is deeply problematic.” (footnote omitted)).
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room for exceptional judicial interventions—even if only narrowly. And
although Kennedy embraces a minimalist approach in Windsor and
Obergefell by leaving undecided so many large doctrinal questions about
LGBT discrimination, his opinions wax grandiloquently about the “dignity
in the bond between two men or two women” and the way that the
“expression, intimacy, and spirituality” of love holds “true for all persons,
whatever their sexual orientation”39—language that will likely invite more
expansive elaboration by the lower courts and, quite possibly, the Supreme
Court.
V.
The Chief Justice’s Obergefell dissent provides a full-throated critique of
Kennedy’s dialogical conception of constitutional development. Roberts
accuses Kennedy’s majority opinion of “omit[ting] even a pretense of
humility” and “openly relying on its desire to remake society according to
its own ‘new insight’ into the ‘nature of injustice.’”40 He chastises the
majority for “[s]tealing this issue from the people”41 and for “cast[ing] a
cloud over same-sex marriage, making a dramatic social change that much
more difficult to accept.”42 Moreover, he warns that “[t]here will be
consequences to shutting down the political process on an issue of such
profound public significance,” for “[p]eople denied a voice are less likely to
accept the ruling of a court on an issue that does not seem to be the sort of
thing courts usually decide.”43 Finally, he intimates that Obergefell could
be the Roe v. Wade of gay rights,44 invoking comments by Justice Ginsburg
a decade after Roe that the decision’s “[h]eavy-handed judicial intervention
was difficult to justify and appears to have provoked, not resolved,
conflict.”45 Yet Obergefell has led to little significant backlash46—and
39. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2564, 2599 (2015).
40. Id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2625.
44. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
45. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2625 (quoting then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 385–
86 (1985)). Roberts’s analogy obscures an important difference between the two cases:
unlike Obergefell, Roe was construed as potentially inviting legislation (and movements to
enact that legislation). See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 170–71 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“These
are legitimate objectives, amply sufficient to permit a State to regulate abortions as it does
other surgical procedures, and perhaps sufficient to permit a State to regulate abortions more
stringently or even to prohibit them in the late stages of pregnancy. But such legislation is
not before us, and I think the Court today has thoroughly demonstrated that these state
interests cannot constitutionally support the broad abridgment of personal liberty worked by
the existing Texas law.”).
46. While some counties across Kentucky, Alabama, and North Carolina are currently
refusing to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples or halting marriage operations
altogether, the vast majority of the states affected by the Court’s decision in Obergefell have
adhered to the ruling without incident. See Freedom to Marry on Track to Close, Despite
Marriage Holdouts, WASHINGTON BLADE (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonblade
.com/2015/09/11/freedom-to-marry-on-track-to-close-despite-marriageholdouts/#sthash.G8ETB1mA.dpuf [http://perma.cc/6T9M-NE5A].
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neither for that matter did Windsor, which precipitated a marked
acceleration in the pace of marriage recognition across the states.47 Rather,
momentum toward full LGBT rights only seems to be increasing within the
political branches.48
While some will criticize Justice Kennedy’s Obergefell decision for
lacking in a sufficiently clear doctrinal holding, the decision to leave things
undecided is characteristic of his larger judicial philosophy. Moreover,
saying less about the precise doctrine could have the intention of prompting
other institutions—namely Congress—to act. Seen this way, judicial
minimalism might reflect a hunch (or hope) that, once the Court acts, a
larger multi-branch dialogue will continue to take shape and evolve both
inside and outside Congress. Meanwhile, Obergefell’s strong rhetoric
indicates to legislators, especially those previously reluctant to support
LGBT rights, that there are strong and compelling legal and moral bases to
do so, especially now that the Court has brought full marriage recognition
to all fifty states.
*

*

*

The gay rights cases are illustrative of a number of important
jurisprudential differences between Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Kennedy that will likely recur in the future. As references to Obergefell
swell within state and federal judicial opinions, not to mention legal briefs
on a variety of issues (many of which have nothing to do with gay rights),49
one should bear in mind not only Obergefell’s core holding, but also the
subtle distinctions that lead Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy to
reach such wildly different legal outcomes in Obergefell, Windsor, and
beyond.

47. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597.
48. Shortly after the opinion, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued a
ruling that sexual orientation based discrimination in the workplace is unlawful under
existing sex discrimination protections. See EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL
4397641, at *4–5 (July 15, 2015). This opinion will not displace court of appeals rulings to
the contrary, but it will take effect in most jurisdictions, where it will undoubtedly help root
out sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace. Meanwhile, Democratic legislators
in Congress have proposed legislation that would eliminate sexual orientation discrimination
in public accommodations, housing, and employment while adding sex discrimination
protections that are absent from certain federal anti-discrimination laws. See Equality Act, S.
1858, H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015). While that bill lacks the Republican support it needs
in order to pass, there are indications of shifting Republican sentiment on LGBT rights more
generally. See, e.g., Philip Elliott, Republicans in Early Nominating States See Opposition to
Gay Rights Fizzle, TIME (July 2, 2015), http://time.com/3945083/republicans-gay-rights/
[http://perma.cc/5Q5B-5ZTK].
49. See Zoe Tillman, How the Supreme Court’s Gay-Marriage Ruling Is Playing in
Trial Courts, NAT’L L.J. (July 27, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/home/id=
1202733182260?slreturn=20150708104111 (“In the month since the U.S. Supreme Court’s
landmark same-sex marriage ruling, federal and state judges are citing the decision in an
array of cases, including some that don’t involve same-sex couples.”) [http://perma.cc/96E8432H].

